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THE FAILED PROMISE OF MENTAL HEALTH 
PARITY IN VIRGINIA: A MISSING KEY IN MENTAL 
HEALTHCARE ACCESS 
ZACHARY WOERNER* 
ABSTRACT 
For those who suffer from the most serious mental illnesses, 
access to mental healthcare is critically important, but often frus-
trated by a Byzantine insurance system. The goal of this Note is to 
sift through the various mental health insurance parity laws, both 
nationally and statewide, and determine where this system breaks 
down. The Note will argue that lack of enforcement of parity laws 
plays a critical role in much of the dysfunction in the marketplace. 
Legislation in Virginia and elsewhere is not always deficient 
on its face. Instead, laws critically lack regulators willing or able 
to implement them. This creates insidious problems in the mental 
healthcare market. The first place to begin enforcement is at the 
state level, where insurance regulation primarily occurs. 
The President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction 
and the Opioid Crisis recently recognized the need for greater en-
forcement of parity laws at the federal level as well. Although this 
Commission is primarily concerned with substance use disorders, 
it recognizes the crucial role that the Department of Labor has in 
enforcing federal parity laws. The DOL currently lacks the tools it 
needs to enforce these laws. It is encouraging that the Commission’s 
Final Report recognizes this. Federal recognition of the problem is 
crucial, and increased enforcement could generate positive results 
for access to care throughout the country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of the forty-three million American adults with some form 
of mental illness, ten million sufferers’ are afflicted with a serious 
mental illness (SMI).1 Out of that ten million, 140,000 of the seri-
ously mentally ill are homeless; 392,037 are imprisoned; and 
755,360 are on probation or parole.2 Meanwhile, 95,000 seriously 
mentally ill persons who need hospitalization cannot find beds, and 
5,000 kill themselves annually.3 These numbers are staggering, but 
do not fully represent the suffering felt by the mentally ill, their 
families, and society.4 And yet, the solutions proposed to address 
these seemingly intractable problems are all too often reactive in 
nature—and insufficient to meet the daunting task of reform.5 
In Virginia, the problem of access to mental healthcare is 
particularly acute.6 In the wake of the Virginia Tech shooting and 
                                                                                                                        
1 DJ JAFFE, INSANE CONSEQUENCES: HOW THE MENTAL HEALTH INDUSTRY 
FAILS THE MENTALLY ILL 20 (2017). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. at 68–76 (The symptoms that accompany SMIs include hallucina-
tions, delusions, and hearing voices that can lead to violence. Oftentimes sufferers 
also face severe cognitive dysfunction, which can be accompanied by total with-
drawal from society. SMIs are physical brain disorders, and many suffer from 
anosognosia, meaning that sufferers have no insight into their illness. In addition, 
those who have a family member with an SMI are two to three times more likely to 
develop depression.); Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Re-
forming Federal Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 28, 35–45 
(2012) [hereinafter Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal] (“U.S. employers 
incur anywhere from $20 billion to $40 billion per year in lost productivity due to 
employees’ mental illness.”); Mental Health America, Position Statement 15: Parity 
in Health Insurance (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/posi 
tions/parity#edn16 [https://perma.cc/NRC9-SY54] (“[I]ndirect costs associated with 
mental illness and substance abuse disorders—excess turnover, lost productivity, 
absenteeism and disability—commonly meet or exceed the direct treatment costs, 
and have been estimated to be as high as $105 billion annually.”). 
5 See JAFFE, supra note 1, at 21 (detailing tragedies that have resulted from 
violent, untreated seriously mentally ill individuals, such as the Virginia Tech 
shooting). 
6 See K. Burnell Evans, State official: Without action, Virginia’s public mental 
hospitals will overflow by 2024, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 28, 2017), 
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/general-assembly 
/state-official-without-action-virginia-s-public-mental-hospitals-will/article924a88 
71-a68b-510e-ba6d-98ae9f466e08.html [https://perma.cc/K87T-WPQ6] (describing 
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the tragedy involving Gus Deeds, Virginia saw two wake up calls 
that have led to legislative action and the commitment of more 
resources to the problem.7 Reforms came in the wake of Gus Deeds’s 
suicide and attempted murder of his father, Virginia State Sena-
tor Creigh Deeds.8 On the afternoon of November 18, 2013, Sen-
ator Deeds was unable to find his son a hospital bed in the state 
of Virginia and Gus was prematurely released from an emergency 
custody order.9 Once released, Gus attacked his father and com-
mitted suicide.10 This tragedy highlights the problem of access to 
adequate mental healthcare for the mentally ill.11 Nevertheless, 
responses have been reactive, with a focus on addressing the im-
mediate problems that crises present, such as increasing hospi-
tal beds after Senator Deeds was unable to find one, rather than 
focusing on systematic defects that create such emergencies in the 
first place.12 Such a narrow focus on putting out fires, rather than 
                                                                                                                        
the prediction of overflow of Virginia’s state mental hospitals without commitment 
of resources, and the hesitancy of some law makers to divert funds to state 
institutions, rather than community-based services). 
7 See JAFFE, supra note 1, at 21 (The Virginia Tech shooter, Seung-Hui Cho, 
suffered from untreated serious mental illness. He killed thirty-two and wounded 
seventeen in April 2007.); Editorial Board, On campuses and around Virginia, 
we see early signs of awareness and security on mental health, DAILY PRESS 
(Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.dailypress.com/news/opinion/editorials/dp-edt-mental 
-health-campus-security-0420-20170419-story.html (“There are indications that 
our commonwealth is serious about its commitment to improving resources 
around the state.”). 
8 See Travis Fain, Mental health reforms, and funding requests, emerging 
from Deeds study group, DAILY PRESS (Oct. 29, 2016, 8:53 PM), http://www.daily 
press.com/news/politics/dp-nws-mental-health-funding-20161026-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/4H4V-DZ3S]; David Ress, Signs of hope on mental health 10 
years after Tech tragedy, DAILY PRESS (Apr. 15, 2017, 6:50 PM), http://www.daily 
press.com/news/politics/dp-nws-va-tech-mental-20170415-story.html (“I believe 
the political will is there [to reform and commit additional resources].”). 
9 Prue Salasky, Report on Deeds attack details flaws in crisis response, DAILY 
PRESS (Mar. 27, 2014, 8:11 PM), http://www.dailypress.com/health/dp-nws-deeds 
-report-issued-20140327-story.html [https://perma.cc/JVD5-UV3G]. 
10 Id. 
11 See id. 
12 ARADHANA BELA SOOD & ROBERT COHEN, THE VIRGINIA TECH MASSACRE: 
STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING MENTAL HEALTH POLICY ON CAMPUS 
AND BEYOND 221 (2015) (“The focus in mental health services continues to be 
on reactive approaches, such as crisis stabilization units, rather than on out-
patient care delivery or on prevention and health promotion.”). 
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looking to the larger causes of those fires, means that insidious 
problems such as access to care, shortage of providers, and lack of 
resources go unaddressed.13 
This Note argues that the source of these problems is a 
lack of enforcement of mental health insurance parity laws on 
the state and federal level, and that more vigorous enforcement 
of parity laws could represent a first step in increasing access to 
psychiatrists and other mental health providers. This Note will 
focus on the effect of under-enforcement of parity laws on access 
to psychiatric care in Virginia and look to examples in other states 
to highlight the different approaches being taken in response to 
this problem. 
Part I of this Note will begin by briefly describing the federal 
legislative backdrop to mental health parity, along with its limi-
tations. The Note will proceed to analyze the shared enforcement re-
sponsibility of the states and federal government, with an emphasis 
on the crucial role that states can play. Part II will identify greater 
enforcement of parity legislation on both the state and federal 
level as a potential first step in solving the greater issue of access 
to mental healthcare across the nation. Part III will detail various 
state legislative parity schemes, with a focus on Virginia. The Note 
will conclude by examining a promising new approach to enforce-
ment of substance abuse treatment laws in New Jersey that could 
represent a critical step in increasing access to mental healthcare 
across the country.  
I. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP 
Parity laws operate on both the state and federal levels.14 Ef-
forts at achieving federal mental health parity began with the Men-
tal Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA).15 MHPA regulated insured 
                                                                                                                        
13 See id. at 221–22. 
14 See Hefei Wen et al., State Parity Laws and Access to Treatment for Sub-
stance Use Disorder in the United States, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 1355, 1356 
(Oct. 23, 2013). 
15 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, sec. 7, § 712, 110 
Stat. 2874 (1996) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006)). For a de-
tailed discussion of the development of federal mental health parity legisla-
tion, see Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 35–45. 
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and self-insured group health plans of non-small employers,16 re-
quiring that the lifetime and annual spending limits that a plan 
specifies not be different for physical and mental health benefits.17 
For example, if a plan does not impose an aggregate lifetime or 
annual limit on covered physical benefits it may not impose such 
a limit on offered mental health benefits.18 One shortcoming of this 
law is that its protections did not reach people with substance 
abuse disorders (SUDs).19 Neither did it require a group health 
plan to actually offer any mental health benefits.20 
The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) built upon the 
MHPA.21 The MHPAEA, like the MHPA, applied to insured and 
self-insured group health plans of non-small employers.22 Thus 
it “did not apply to small group plans, individual plans, the Med-
icare Program, Medicaid non-managed care plans, or ... self-funded, 
non-federal government plans whose sponsor opted out of 
MHPAEA.”23 Like the MHPA, it did not require that insurers of-
fer or provide any mental health benefits, but only applied if the 
plan already offered mental health coverage.24 
Substantively, it mandated that financial requirements (such 
as deductibles, co-pays, co-insurance, and other out-of-pocket ex-
penses) and treatment limitations (inpatient day and outpatient 
visit limitations) that group health plans imposed on mental health 
                                                                                                                        
16 See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 36 (defin-
ing “non-small ... as those employers that employ an average of [fifty-one] or 
more employees.”). 
17 Id. at 37. 
18 See id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 36 (“In terms of its substantive provision, MHPA was neither a man-
dated offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in MHPA required a cov-
ered group health plan to actually offer or provide any mental health benefits.”). 
21 Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, secs. 511–12, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881–93 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) [hereinafter Wellstone & Domenici]. 
22 See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 38. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. (explaining that MHPAEA was “neither a mandated offer nor a 
mandated benefit law”). 
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and SUD benefits be no more restrictive than those imposed on 
physical health benefits.25 Although the law is spotty in terms of 
its reach, the MHPAEA represented a major stride forward to-
ward parity on the federal level.26 As of January 13, 2014, the 
Final Rules implementing the MHPAEA went into effect.27 
Most recently in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) expanded many of the protections offered by the 
MHPA and MHPAEA.28 The ACA increased the scope of parity: 
new ACA-created state insurance exchanges now were also subject 
to MHPA and MHPAEA provisions.29 Additionally, the ACA man-
dates that plans on state-run exchanges offer mental health and 
addiction coverage at parity with physical illness coverage.30 This 
mandate is a big step because it requires the offer of mental health 
and SUD benefits for specified plans including “the exchange-
offered qualified health plan, the non-exchange individual health 
plan, the non-exchange small group health plan, the Medicaid 
benchmark plan, the benchmark-equivalent plan, and the Medi-
caid state plan.”31 
The surface of these federal legislative advances suggests 
substantial progress toward actual parity.32 All told, the MHPAEA 
extended parity to 103 million people in large-employer plans, while 
the ACA, in extending the application of the MHPAEA, affected 
                                                                                                                        
25 Id. 
26 See Richard G. Frank, Realizing the Promise of Parity Legislation, 74 JAMA 
PSYCHIATRY 117, 117 (2017). 
27 Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68, 240 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to 
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 53, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146–47). 
28 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 
1302(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 163 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1) (Supp. V 
2012)); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305). Collectively, these two laws 
are now referred to as the Affordable Care Act. See Tovino, All Illnesses Are 
(Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 40. 
29 Aubrey Chamberlain, Note, Stop the Bleeding: A Call for Clarity to Achieve 
True Mental Health Parity, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 253, 259 (2014). 
30 Id. 
31 See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 41 (ex-
plaining these protections do not reach grandfathered health plans that were 
in effect on March 23, 2010, the day the law was signed). 
32 See Frank, supra note 26, at 117. 
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an additional 30 million in small group plans, 18 million in the 
individual market, and 23 million under Medicaid.33 With the 
future of the ACA in jeopardy due to political efforts to unwind 
it, these temporary federal gains are fragile.34 
Despite this surface-level progress, enforcement of federal 
and state parity provisions remains a problem.35 However, some 
signs of hope exist. The recently formed President’s Commission 
on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis shows that 
parity enforcement, at least for substance abuse treatment, is now 
a top priority on the federal level.36 
A. The Burden of Enforcement: State and Federal Legislative 
Dreams Deferred 
While federal parity laws govern the majority of insurance 
plans in the nation, states have their own parity laws and regula-
tors as well.37 Enforcement of the parity laws falls mostly on the 
                                                                                                                        
33 See id. (“The combined reach of MHPAEA and the ACA has affected the 
health insurance coverage for more than 170 million people.”). 
34 See Pete Early, Guess Who Voted In Favor Of Bill That Every Mental Health 
Group Claims Will Put Millions At Risk?, PETEEARLY (Mar. 13, 2017), http:// 
www.peteearley.com/2017/03/13/guess-who-voted-in-favor-of-bill-that-every-men 
tal-health-group-claims-will-put-millions-at-risk/ [https://perma.cc/Y9MB-T4QK] 
(“The Republican’s repeal legislation as currently written will end Obama-
care’s Medicaid expansion, which covers 1.2 million Americans with serious 
mental illness and substance abuse problems, as well as [] scrap baseline cov-
erage requirements.”). 
35 See Frank, supra note 26, at 118 (“[T]he federal government must en-
sure that a fabric of enforcement is in place [including] alignment of federal 
and state agencies that monitor and enforce the requirements of MHPAEA.”). 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 185–86. 
37 Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 HOUS. 
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 459–60 (2012) [hereinafter Tovino, Reforming State 
Parity Law] (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2010) “The business of insurance, and 
every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States 
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.”) (“The regulation 
of insurance, including health insurance, traditionally has been a state responsi-
bility.”); see also PATRICK J. KENNEDY & STEPHEN FRIED, A COMMON STRUGGLE 
254, 360 (2015) (noting that “state laws often influence patient experiences much 
more than national mandates” and that parity is basically a state and local issue). 
But see Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra, at 459 n.23 (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1012(b) (2010)) (reserving the right of Congress to pass certain federal legisla-
tion, provided that it relates to the business of insurance); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) 
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shoulders of the states.38 States have taken divergent approaches 
to passing parity legislation of their own.39 The twenty-three states 
with parity laws vary widely in composition and the degree to 
which they are enforced.40 Even despite the legislative progress in 
many statehouses across the country, fundamental problems re-
main.41 These problems include weak or nonexistent parity laws 
and under-enforcement of parity laws generally.42 This combina-
tion of weak laws and under-enforcement has rippling effects 
through the mental healthcare market.43 
While state and federal regulators have an easier time en-
suring parity of co-payments and deductibles, enforcement of the 
parity requirements for the actual delivery of medical services is 
lacking.44 New York is one of the few states that now enforces 
parity.45 In 2011, the Attorney General (AG) of New York’s Health 
Hotline began noticing a pattern of denial of claims by insurers 
involving mental health addiction treatments.46 After an AG in-
vestigation, it was discovered that some New York insurers denied 
                                                                                                                        
(explaining ERISA preempts state insurance laws that relate to employee benefit 
plans if the state law is not saved by ERISA’s “savings clause”). 
38 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 486–87; see 
generally KENNEDY & FRIED, supra note 37, at 254 (noting that “state laws often 
influences patient experiences much more than national mandates” and that 
parity is basically a state and local issue). 
39 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 487 (“many states 
have mental health parity laws that are contrary to or less stringent than federal 
law, especially MHPAEA and ACA.”). 
40 Michael Ollove, Despite Laws, Mental Health Still Getting Short Shrift, 
STATELINE (May 7, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis 
/blogs/stateline/2015/5/07/despite-laws-mental-health-still-getting-short-shrift 
[https://perma.cc/2NQ9-VH9J]; see also Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra 
note 37, at 461–79 (comparing the divergent parity laws in Vermont, Maryland, 
Nevada, and Idaho, which offer differing levels of protection). 
41 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 490–501. 
42 See id. at 461–79, 487; Ollove, supra note 40. 
43 See, e.g., John Shemo et al., Psychiatric Society of Virginia: District Branch 
Report (Mar. 12–13, 2016), http://www.psva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/spring 
/district-branch-report.html [https://perma.cc/U6BU-97L3] (explaining the lack 
of parity enforcement leads to “more and more psychiatrists [quitting] insurance 
panels, saving the insurance companies even more as patients are not able to 
find any ‘network providers’ and the companies reimburse the patient even less 
than they reimburse the network provider for using a ‘non-network provider.’”). 
44 Ollove, supra note 40. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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nearly half of claims for behavioral health treatment.47 Addi-
tionally, there were exclusions for certain types of treatment like 
eating disorders and a “fail first” policy before gaining approval 
to enter a residential facility.48 In response, the New York AG 
reached settlements with five insurance plans for violating state 
parity laws.49 
In March 2015, the New York AG reached a $900,000 set-
tlement with Beacon Health Options, who was found to deny 
behavioral health claims twice as often as other medical or surgical 
claims, and four times as often for addiction recovery services.50 The 
settlement also required that Beacon Health (formerly ValueOp-
tions) overhaul its claim review process and cooperate with an 
ongoing appeal process for members who had been denied claims.51 
In addition to the fine imposed, the settlement required Beacon 
Health to remove visit limitations for almost all behavioral health 
services, provide detailed rationale for denial of claims to allow for 
member appeals, reimburse coverage of treatment for diagnoses 
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American 
Psychiatric Association (DSM), and file regular compliance reports 
with the New York AG.52 The New York AG reached settlements 
with four other health plans found to be in noncompliance with par-
ity laws.53 As a result, “45 percent of previously rejected mental 
health and substance abuse claims [were] overturned on appeal.”54 
Successful enforcement efforts like this show that vigorous enforce-
ment could yield similar benefits on the state and federal levels. 
                                                                                                                        
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Press Release, AG Eric Schneiderman, A.G. Schneiderman Announces 
Settlement with ValueOptions to End Wrongful Denial of Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse Treatment Services (Mar. 5, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-re 
lease/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-valueoptions-end-wrongful-denial 
-mental-health [https://perma.cc/4RG8-W5ML]. 
51 Id. 
52 The settlement included many other provisions to ensure Beacon’s com-
pliance with New York parity laws: it required that Beacon maintain an accurate 
online provider directory, conduct full and fair reviews of services that require 
preauthorization (e.g., inpatient SUD treatment), remove the “fail-first” standard 
previously applied for entry into residential services, and begin integrating med-
ical and behavioral health claims. Id. 
53 Ollove, supra note 40. 
54 Id. 
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Patterns of discrimination are likely not confined to New 
York—they only came to light because of the Attorney General’s 
enforcement effort.55 In the words of Patrick Kennedy, “it’s only 
logical that there are similar practices [of discrimination] in other 
states ... [insurance companies] can’t just be picking on New 
Yorkers.”56 Emily Feinstein of CASAColumbia similarly opined, 
“I haven’t seen a lot of evidence of states enforcing parity.”57 
Even when the laws on the books are adequate, their under-
enforcement leads to perverse outcomes that can be seen empiri-
cally.58 In New York, where an aggressively enforced parity law was 
in place, 11 percent (1.8 million people) of the population suffered 
from a substance abuse disorder, but only 11 percent of those indi-
viduals (198,000 people) received any treatment.59 In comparison, 
70 percent of those with hypertension and diabetes received treat-
ment.60 This astonishing figure speaks clearly to the lack of access 
to care. Similarly, in a 2015 survey conducted by the National Alli-
ance for Mental Illness, nearly one third of respondents in need of 
mental healthcare were denied care, over twice the rate of denial 
                                                                                                                        
55 See id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Sarah Goodell, Health Policy Brief: Enforcing Mental Health Parity, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb201511 
09.624272/full/ [https://perma.cc/7V9C-FJ9K] (“Perhaps resulting from this patch-
work [of regulatory authorities entrusted with enforcement including DOL, 
HHS, and other state insurance commissioners], enforcement on the state and 
federal levels has been minimal, with a few exceptions.”); see also Jenny Gold, 
Congress tried to fix mental health care in 2008, VOX (Aug. 3, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2015/8/3/9069643/mental-health-parity-lawsuits [https:// 
perma.cc/Q7SB-9PQN] (according to Henry Harbin, Maryland’s former mental 
health director, “insurers are taking advantage of the minimal oversight.” With 
little oversight, insurers “micromanage care down to almost nothing.” Past hesi-
tance to “step on the toes” of insurers could partly be explained by the Obama 
administration’s fear of angering insurers who were instrumental in helping 
the administration pass the Affordable Care Act). 
59 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, IN RE VALUEOPTIONS, INC., 
ASSURANCE NO. 14-176, ASSURANCE OF DISCONTINUANCE UNDER EXECUTIVE LAW 
SECTION 63, SUBDIVISION 15 AT 3 (2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ValueOptions 
AOD-FullyExecuted.pdf [https://perma.cc/874N-Z5WA] [hereinafter IN RE VALUE 
OPTIONS, INC.]. 
60 Id. 
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for general medical care.61 There is a clear link between under-
enforcement of parity laws and lack of access to care.62 
The greater problem of access is likely also a result of lack 
of mental health resources.63 In 2014, Paul Appelbaum, former 
Director of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) lamented 
the lack of resources dedicated to mental healthcare, particularly 
on the part of the federal government.64 
Those who wait on the federal government to jumpstart a 
“joint federal-state commitment ... to fund[] the infrastructure of 
a care system” will likely be waiting a long time.65 Asking for more 
resources, in a more comprehensive way, is a contingent solution 
based on the dubious hope that the political will to commit more 
resources will suddenly appear.66 Political will seems to be in short 
supply these days, particularly since the federal government 
                                                                                                                        
61 National Alliance on Mental Illness, A LONG ROAD AHEAD: ACHIEVING TRUE 
PARITY IN MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE CARE 4 (2015), https://www 
.nami.org/About-NAMI/Publications-Reports/Public-Policy-Reports/A-Long-Road 
-Ahead/2015-ALongRoadAhead.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ9L-97HH] (comparing 
survey results from 2720 people in need of mental healthcare with an analysis of 
84 health plans in 15 states, focusing on the results of the 1225 respondents 
with private insurance who are the subject of the final parity rule of July 1, 2014). 
62 See Jonathan Purtle et al., An audience research study to disseminate evi-
dence about comprehensive state mental health parity legislation to US State 
policymakers: protocol, 12 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 1, 2 (2017), https://implementa 
tionscience.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13012-017-0613-9 [https:// 
perma.cc/P2B6-9M7P] (finding that insurer’s noncompliance with parity laws 
contributes to restricted access to services for “19 [percent] of the US population 
with a mental illness”); Goodell, supra note 58, at 4–5. 
63 See Paul S. Appelbaum, How to Rebuild America’s Mental Health System, 
in 5 Big Steps, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2014, 8:08 PM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/commentisfree/2014/may/29/-sp-fix-america-mental-health-system-ideas 
[https://perma.cc/35EY-AT4Y]. 
64 “Today, paying for mental health care is nobody’s responsibility. Insurers 
pay as little as possible, often denying claims on flimsy grounds. States have 
cut more than $4 [billion] from their mental health budgets in the last six years. 
The federal government directly contributes only a tiny amount to supporting 
mental health treatment beyond the coverage it provides through Medicare 
and Medicaid.” Id. 
65 Id. 
66 The plea for more federal money is not only contingent, but potentially also 
misguided: “Before investing more, we should ensure that a greater percentage 
of the existing mega mental health budget goes to serving the most seriously ill.” 
JAFFE, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
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already spends $147 billion annually to fund mental health.67 As 
demonstrated by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service 
Administration’s (SAMHSA) Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, addi-
tional resources do not seem to be forthcoming; compared to its 
2017 Fiscal Year Budget, SAMHSA’s 2018 budget faced cuts of 
nearly $400 million.68 
Nor is a lack of legislation the fundamental problem.69 On 
paper, the laws are often adequate to put state and federal gov-
ernments in the position to demand parity.70 The problem is reali-
zation of this ideal, and mechanisms to ensure that what is written 
is carried out.71 The enforcement of state and federal parity laws 
needs to begin at the state level.72 Rather than dump more re-
sources on the nonfunctioning system, governments need to rec-
ognize how to work smarter with less.73 States need to start holding 
“insurers’ feet to [the] fire to make certain they live up [to] their 
obligations under the Mental Health Parity Act.”74 Holding in-
surers accountable through enforcement of the law, particularly 
at the state level where insurance regulation primarily occurs, is 
a potential first step in addressing the broader issue of restricted 
access to care.75 
II. THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR ACCESS: ESTABLISHING A  
FUNCTIONAL MENTAL HEALTHCARE MARKET 
Resources and access are closely related.76 Lack of resources, 
or inefficient allocation of resources, exacerbates barriers to access.77 
                                                                                                                        
67 See id. at 21. 
68 Dept. of Health & Human Servs., HHS FY 2018 Budget in Brief—SAMHSA 
(last updated May 23, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2018/budget 
-in-brief/samhsa/index.html [https://perma.cc/WHT6-3QJ3] (detailing a $374 mil-
lion decrease in discretionary budget authority for 2018). 
69 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 461–79; Frank, 
supra note 26, at 117–18. 
70 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 461–82. 
71 See Goodell, supra note 58, at 4–5. 
72 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37 and accompany-
ing text. 
73 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
74 See Appelbaum, supra note 63. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. But see JAFFE, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
77 See Appelbaum, supra note 63. 
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Commitment of resources toward enforcement of parity laws could 
be a relatively cheap first step to laying the foundation of a func-
tional mental healthcare market.78 Particularly since mental health 
resources are under attack at the federal level, and because $147 
billion is already being spent by the federal government, shifting 
the focus to enforcement where it has the potential to be most 
effective—at the local level—is a logical first step.79 
As discussed above, insurance companies frequently deny or 
undercompensate claims relating to mental health procedures, 
which has a twofold effect.80 First, it discourages people from 
seeking out care, for fear of not being reimbursed.81 Those who do 
receive care may be denied coverage for medically necessary treat-
ment and saddled with unconscionably high bills that their in-
surance theoretically should cover.82 
Second, mental healthcare providers are less likely to accept 
private insurance, Medicaid, or Medicare, for fear that they will not 
be reimbursed for the procedure.83 A study published in JAMA 
                                                                                                                        
78 See Gold, supra note 58. Such implementation could be cheap from an 
administrative perspective, but potentially expensive to insurers, who are resistant 
to such regulatory scrutiny, and who are large political stakeholders. 
79 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
80 See PATRICK J. KENNEDY & STEPHEN FRIED, A COMMON STRUGGLE 254, 360 
(2015); John Shemo et al., Psychiatric Society of Virginia District Branch Report to 
the Area V Council Meeting, PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY OF VIRGINIA DISTRICT BRANCH 
REPORT (Spring 2016), http://www.psva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/spring/dis 
trict-branch-report.html [https://perma.cc/U6BU-97L3]; Tovino, Reforming State 
Parity Law, supra note 37, at 455, 459–60 (2012); Michelle Ollove, Despite Laws, 
Mental Health Still Getting Short Shrift, STATELINE (May 7, 2015), http://www 
.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/5/07/despite-laws 
-mental-health-still-getting-short-shrift [https://perma.cc/2NQ9-VH9J]; supra 
notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
81 DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon 
General 457 (1999) (“Financial obstacles discourage people from seeking treatment 
and from staying in treatment. Repeated surveys have shown that concerns about 
the cost of care are among the foremost reasons why people do not seek care.”). 
82 See Parity: What’s Next?, THE KENNEDY FORUM (Nov. 7, 2017), https:// 
thekennedyforum.org/parity-whats-next/; infra notes 168–69 and accompanying 
text (detailing a New Jersey woman’s story of taking out a mortgage to fund 
inpatient treatment for her two sons, whose medical bills amounted to over 
$300,000 combined). 
83 Tara F. Bishop et al., Acceptance of Insurance by Psychiatrists and the 
Implications for Access to Mental Health Care, 71 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 176, 179 
(2013), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/1785174 
?version=meter%20at%2015&module=meter-Links&pgtype=article&contentId 
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Psychiatry found that only 55 percent of psychiatrists accepted 
private insurance.84 This was small compared to the 89 percent 
acceptance rate of other medical specialties.85 Rather than fight 
with insurance companies to get paid, which is time consuming and 
may jeopardize the viability of their practice, many psychiatrists 
opt out of the health insurance market entirely and only accept 
patients who will pay out-of-pocket.86 For the mental healthcare 
patient or consumer, the problem of access is acutely felt.87 It is 
very difficult for consumers to find a living psychiatrist within the 
insurer’s network, who is accepting new patients.88 In a study of 
three major cities, after one round of phone calls, investigators were 
able to reach 119 out of 360 psychiatrists (33 percent), and after a 
second round of calling, were able to successfully make appoint-
ments with ninety-three psychiatrists (26 percent).89 A similar 
study in Washington, D.C. found that only fourteen percent of psy-
chiatrists listed in-network were available to schedule new outpa-
tient appointments, the other eighty-six percent either unreachable 
or not taking new patients.90 This is a nonfunctioning market.91 
By enforcing parity, some stability would be injected into a 
dysfunctional market. In Virginia, for instance, the effect of non-
enforcement of parity laws is a flight from Virginia by providers.92 
                                                                                                                        
=&mediaId=&referrer=https://www.google.com/&priority=true&action=click
&contentCollection=meter-links-click [https://perma.cc/4533-ETQY]. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 See, e.g., Monica Malowney et al., Availability of Outpatient Care from 
Psychiatrists: A Simulated-Patient Study in Three U.S. Cities, 66 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 94, 94–96 (2015), http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/pdf/10.1176/appi.ps 
.201400051 [https://perma.cc/89RX-NWGB] (conducting a phone survey in Boston, 
Chicago, and Houston of all Blue Cross Blue Shield providers in the cities to 
determine the extent of availability of in-network providers). 
89 Id. 
90 Majority of Psychiatrists Listed in DC Health Insurance Exchange Net-
work Not Available For New Patient Appointments, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N 
(May 16, 2016), https://www.psychiatry.org/newsroom/news-releases/majority 
-of-psychiatrists-listed-in-dc-health-insurance-exchange-network-not-available 
-for-new-patient-appointments [https://perma.cc/LEJ8-BVRM]. 
91 See id. 
92 John Shemo, American Psychiatric Association Assembly Meeting, PSY-
CHIATRIC SOC’Y OF VA NEWS, Winter 2015, at 19, http://www.psva.org/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2015/12/PSV_VA_News_Winter2015_web1.pdf [https://perma.cc 
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Knowing that they will not be reimbursed by insurance companies 
for the services they render, psychiatrists often either refuse to 
accept private insurance or flee from the state altogether.93 When 
insurance companies fail to reimburse psychiatric procedures at 
the same rate as other medical procedures, the effect is to depress 
wages for psychiatrists.94 Enforcing parity provisions would ad-
dress the brain-drain problem in states like Virginia.95 It would also 
work toward stabilizing a market for care by getting providers on 
board and creating incentives for them to operate in the market, 
rather than outside of it.96 
Insurers play a key role in this conversation.97 Many likely 
ignore the laws on the books and get away with it.98 Anecdotal 
evidence of noncompliance is often all that is available, however, 
because insurers refuse to release information about the rates at 
which they reimburse, reasoning that the information is proprie-
tary.99 
A recent survey of forty-two million patients from 2013 to 
2015 confirms that there are significant disparities between mental 
                                                                                                                        
/WGW9-AKAB] (detailing the flight of nearly eighty percent of psychiatric resi-
dency trainees from Virginia). 
93 Id. (“This [flight from Virginia] is in part due to the extremely low in-
surance reimbursement schedules for psychiatrists in Virginia.”). 
94 Jennifer Nelson, Talk is cheap: How insurance changed the face of psy-
chiatry, INSURE (Feb. 6, 2013) (asserting that “doctors can’t afford to go into 
psychiatry because of [low] insurance reimbursement [rates] .... [I]t is the lowest 
paying field for doctors and, with the cost of additional medical school for spe-
cialization, it isn’t worth it.” In addition, “mental health professionals have argu-
ably the worst reimbursements in health care, and many are leaving the field 
or working outside of the health care insurance system.”). 
95 See Shemo, supra note 92, at 19. 
96 See Goodell, supra note 58, at 5. 
97 See Gold, supra note 58. 
98 Id. (“[D]emonstrating that an insurer has violated parity rules requires 
a detailed analysis of a plan’s mental health and medical benefits .... [While] 
the law requires that insurers disclose that information, critics say they often 
do not comply.” Indeed, “virtually no insurers will release documents.”); Despite 
Federal Law, Some Insurance Exchange Plans Offer Unequal Coverage for Mental 
Health, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Mar. 2, 2015), 
https://www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2015/despite-federal-law-some-insur 
ance-exchange-plans-offer-unequal-coverage-for-mental-health.html [https:// 
perma.cc/K3TV-VMLS] (detailing how one quarter of plans sold on Obamacare 
exchanges in two states appeared to violate federal parity laws). 
99 See Gold, supra note 58. 
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and physical healthcare reimbursement rates.100 This study demon-
strated that both primary and specialty care providers received 
higher reimbursement rates than did behavioral health providers 
for comparable services.101 In addition, the study found that mental 
health patients used out-of-network providers substantially more 
often than did medical/surgical care patients.102 In 2015, the propor-
tion of behavioral healthcare provided out-of-network was 3.6 to 
5.8 times higher than was the proportion of medical/surgical care.103 
The two findings are likely closely related: lower reimbursement 
rates offered to mental health providers likely lead to providers not 
opting in to a health plan’s network, thus creating difficulty for pa-
tients looking for scarce in-network mental health providers.104 
Demonstrating the abstract concepts described above is an 
exchange between Anthem Virginia and Dr. John Shemo, a Vir-
ginia provider and former director of the Psychiatric Society of 
Virginia.105 In the letters between Dr. Shemo and the Anthem 
representative, Dr. Shemo complains about Anthem’s discrimi-
natory practice of denying reimbursement for certain procedure 
                                                                                                                        
100 STEPHEN P. MELEK ET AL., ADDICTION AND MENTAL HEALTH VS. PHYSICAL 
HEALTH: ANALYZING DISPARITIES IN NETWORK USE AND PROVIDER REIMBURSE-
MENT RATES 1 (2017), http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2017/NQ 
TLDisparityAnalysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5U7-VVLZ]. 
101 Across the country, when compared to behavioral health providers, primary 
care providers received a 20.7 to 22 percent higher average reimbursement rate, 
while specialists received a 17.1 to 19.1 percent higher rate. Id. at 2. In Virginia 
from 2013 to 2015, primary care reimbursement rates were on average 39.53 
percent higher than behavioral reimbursement rates, while average specialist 
rates were 32.26 percent higher. See id. at apps. J–L. 
102 The study found that “[o]ut-of-network utilization for behavioral care 
nearly doubled in the inpatient setting, increasing from 9.6 [percent] to 16.7 
[percent], and more than doubled in the outpatient facility setting, increasing 
from 15.6 [percent] to 31.6 [percent] between 2013 and 2015.” Out-of-network be-
havioral healthcare utilization is much higher when compared to medical/surgical 
out-of-network patient utilization, which consistently hovered between 3.4 and 4 
percent for inpatient facilities and between 5.3 and 5.6 percent for outpatient 
facilities. Id. at 3–4. 
103 Id. at 3. 
104 Id. at 2–3. 
105 Letter from John Shemo, Med. Director, Psychiatric Alliance of the Blue 
Ridge, to Anthony L. Pelonero, Med. Director, Behavioral Health Care, Anthem 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va. (July 15, 2013), http://www.psva.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2013/11/Letter_Shemo_Request_15Jul13.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9GT 
-9MQB] [hereinafter Shemo Letter]. 
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codes.106 Anthem justified its denial of Dr. Shemo’s reimburse-
ment request by stating that his “diagnosis and procedure codes 
[were] not ‘compatible.’”107 Such an exchange demonstrates Dr. 
Shemo’s frustration in dealing with Anthem. More importantly, it 
demonstrates the difficulties of running a business dependent upon 
such reimbursements.108 For psychiatrists like Dr. Shemo, conduct-
ing an hour worth of treatment for less than $50 is not justifiable.109 
As the Milliman study demonstrates, disparate insurance company 
reimbursement practices likely contribute to psychiatrists’ decision 
not to opt in to health plans.110 
The insurance company’s response is instructive as well.111 
In response, Dr. Anthony Pelonero of Anthem justifies the in-
surance company’s denial: 
Anthem’s reimbursement rates for psychiatrists and other physi-
cians are market driven and reflect a myriad of factors, including 
the fact that psychiatrists, on average, have a lower cost structure 
than most other physicians. Parity requires the use of compa-
rable processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, and other fac-
tors, for mental health benefits and medical/surgical benefits, 
and it requires that these factors are applied in a comparably 
stringent manner. It does not require that the reimbursement 
rates for evaluation and management services performed by psy-
chiatrists be the same.112 
                                                                                                                        
106 See id. 
107 See id. (alteration in original) (“Anthem sees fit to ‘allow’ only $49.96 
for this hour of service, $19.96 from Anthem and $30.00 from the patient. They 
are reimbursing the 99213 code but are denying the accompanying 90836 code in 
its entirety, saying that the diagnosis and procedure codes are not ‘compatible.’ 
The diagnosis codes used are directly from the DSM-IV and similar codes are in 
the DSM-5. Thus, they are by definition psychiatric diagnosis codes used with 
psychiatric procedure codes.”). 
108 See id.; see also Shemo, supra note 92 (explaining that Anthem Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, the largest insurer in Virginia, “reimburses for procedure 
codes 99213/90836 and 99214/90836 at less than half of the Medicare reim-
bursement rates”). 
109 Shemo Letter, supra note 105. 
110 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–3. 
111 Letter from Anthony L. Pelonero, Med. Director, Behavioral Health Care, 
Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., to John Shemo, Med. Director, Psychi-
atric Alliance of the Blue Ridge (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.psva.org/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2013/11/Letter_Pelonero_Response_15Jul13_12Sep13.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/62E3-YVR9] [hereinafter Pelonero Letter]. 
112 Id. 
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Regardless of the legal validity of this position, one thing 
is clear: the provider will not be reimbursed at actual parity, and 
the insurance company is not operating outside of the law.113 
Anthem’s justification is an economic one.114 A psychiatrist’s cost 
structure is not the same as that of most ordinary physicians, and 
so the insurance company is not required to reimburse at the same 
rate.115 An investigation into the state legislative scheme will yield 
an answer on whether this is correct or not.116 Nevertheless, the 
limiting effect of such an approach on access to treatment is clear.117 
This trend can be seen on the micro-level as well. When one of 
Virginia’s largest insurers frequently reimburses providers at a 
fraction of the rate of other comparable procedures, this disincen-
tivizes providers from accepting that insurance, which creates 
downward pressure on the wages of psychiatrists, and so disin-
centivizes psychiatrists from operating in the market.118 
Even assuming the costs of enforcing parity would be out 
of step with the services rendered, the insurance company clearly 
misses the broader individual, familial, and societal impacts of its 
actions.119 There are extreme negative externalities in the fall-
out from the lack of access to adequate mental health services.120 
Ultimately, by deferring necessary treatment, insurers may also 
be shooting themselves in the foot.121 Some estimates say that 
the societal costs that result from inadequate treatment exceed 
$100 billion per year.122 These costs are likely not the foremost 
                                                                                                                        
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See infra Part III; see also Gold, supra note 58 (insurers more often re-
quire preauthorization for psychiatric doctor visits, have “fail first” policies for 
access to inpatient care, and require determinations of “medical necessity” 
before patients are covered for appropriate levels of care). 
117 See, e.g., Bishop et al., supra note 83, at 176–80. 
118 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–3; Shemo, supra note 92; Pelonero 
Letter, supra note 111; Shemo Letter, supra note 105; see also supra notes 108–12 
and accompanying text. 
119 See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4. 
120 Id. 
121 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 58 (“The irony in all this is that [the insurer] 
fights tooth and nail to dole out care for my son. But had they allowed him upfront 
to get the care he needed, he might not have ended up back in the hospital, which 
they had to pay for.”) (alteration in original). 
122 Id. 
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concern of insurance companies, who have their shareholders and 
bottom line to worry about.123 Some studies suggest, however, that 
by not adequately treating mental health, the cost that insurance 
companies pay for physical treatments goes up as well.124 This 
phenomenon is known as the offset effect.125 
Insurance companies justify not offering mental health and 
SUD benefits at parity by claiming that doing so will raise costs 
for insurers.126 However, many studies refute this claim.127 One 
such study compared patients diagnosed with depression to those 
without it and found that untreated, depressed patients have higher 
medical costs on average, “associated with a twofold increase in 
use of health services.”128 The greater utilization of medical ser-
vices by depressed patients was found to be more costly than the 
costs associated with treating the depression itself.129 
In a similar 2009 study, 14,902 Medicare beneficiaries with 
either diabetes, congestive heart failure, or both were split into 
three groups: those diagnosed with depression, those not officially 
diagnosed but who screened positive, and those who were not de-
pressed.130 Those diagnosed with depression incurred $22,960 in 
total costs over one year on average, with mental healthcare costs 
accounting for less than 2 percent of total health costs.131 By com-
parison, those without depression had costs of $11,956 per year, 
and those with possible depression had costs of $14,365.132 Higher 
Medicare co-payments for outpatient mental healthcare at the 
time (50 percent co-pay for outpatient mental versus 20 percent 
for outpatient physical healthcare at the time of the study) were 
likely an obstacle for depressed patients that stopped them from 
                                                                                                                        
123 See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 4, at 9–13. 
124 See id. at 10–32. 
125 See id. at 29 n.195. 
126 See id. at 4. 
127 See id. at 15–27. 
128 See id. at 15 (citing Greg E. Simon et al., Health Care Costs of Primary 
Care Patients with Recognized Depression, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 850, 
850–54 (1995)). 
129 See id. at 16. 
130 See id. at 18–20 (citing Jürgen Unützer et al., Healthcare Costs Associ-
ated with Depression in Medically Ill Fee-for-Service Medicare Participants, 57 
J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC. 506 (2009)). 
131 Id. at 19. 
132 Id. 
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seeking outpatient mental health treatment entirely.133 The study 
concluded that increased utilization of evidence-based depression 
care could generate long-term cost savings.134 Instead of increased 
costs, these studies show that shifting resources to needed mental 
health treatment may actually generate cost savings for insurers 
when taking account of total healthcare costs.135 
Another study found that each dollar invested in full-
continuum and partial-continuum addiction care generated returns 
that were 9.7 and 23.3 times their baseline investments, respec-
tively.136 The study concluded that both types of “addiction care 
can generate positive and significant net benefits to society.”137 
Increased mental health and substance abuse treatment, when 
medically necessary, can generate net economic benefits contrary 
to the claims of insurers; policy makers should take notice.138 
III. VIRGINIA’S LEGISLATIVE SCHEME  
IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 
A. Virginia’s Lack of Enforcement Weakens an Otherwise 
Strong Law 
Virginia, when compared to other states, has a typical state 
mental health parity law.139 The law first specifies that group and 
individual health insurance coverage “shall provide mental health 
and substance use disorder benefits.”140 The Virginia law goes be-
yond the MHPAEA, insofar as it mandates that a specified subclass 
of insurers offer mental health and substance abuse benefits.141 
This is referred to as a “mandated benefit” law.142 
                                                                                                                        
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 19–20. 
135 See id. 
136 Id. at 22 (full-continuum care cost averaged $2,530 and generated eco-
nomic benefits of $20,639, while partial-continuum average cost was $1,138 with 
$12,130 average economic benefits). 
137 Id. 
138 See generally Purtle et al., supra note 62. 
139 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1 (West 2017). 
140 Id. § 38.2-3412.1(B). 
141 Id.; see Wellstone & Domenici, supra note 21. 
142 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 463–64 (“Man-
dated benefit laws require all health insurance plans to include the mandated 
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The types of insurers that fall into the subclass that must 
offer mental health benefits include “group and individual health 
insurance coverage,” excepting grandfathered plans in the small 
group market, which have explicit limitations on the extent of cov-
erage for inpatient and outpatient services available.143 Virginia 
law similarly requires that state employee health plans offer cov-
erage for a “biologically based mental illness.”144 
Curiously, section 38.2-3412.1 contains no such reference 
to “biologically based mental illness,” but defines “mental health 
services,” as those benefits “for mental health conditions as de-
fined under the terms of the health benefit plan ... [with any 
condition defined therein] to be consistent with generally recognized 
independent standards of current medical practice.”145 This raises 
the question: what is the scope of a “mental health condition”? In 
practice, the scope is whatever the insurance plan chooses to define 
it as, so long as the definition is consistent with current standards of 
medical practice.146 Contrast this definition with Vermont’s par-
ity law, which defines “mental health condition” as inclusive of 
“all mental illnesses listed in the mental disorders section of the 
                                                                                                                        
benefit ... regardless of whether a particular insured requires or believes she will 
require the benefit.”). 
143 § 38.2-3412.1(B)–(D) (limiting inpatient care in grandfathered small group 
plans to twenty days for adults per year and twenty-five days for children, allow-
ing for conversion of ten days of inpatient care to fifteen days of partial hospi-
talization benefit; and providing that such plans provide a minimum of twenty 
outpatient treatment visits for adults and children (excluding medication man-
agement visits), providing minimum levels of co-insurance coverage of 50 percent 
to outpatient visits beyond the first five visits, and providing that if all covered 
expenses for an outpatient visit or substance abuse treatment apply toward any 
deductible required by policy or contract, such visit shall not count toward the 
outpatient benefit maximum). 
144 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2818(B)(17) (West 2017) (defining “biologically based 
mental illness” as “any mental or nervous condition caused by a biological disorder 
of the brain that results in a clinically significant syndrome that substantially 
limits the person’s functioning,” specifically including “schizophrenia, schizo-
affective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism, 
and drug and alcoholism addiction”). 
145 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1(A) (West 2017) (alteration in original) (em-
phasis added). 
146 See id. 
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current edition of the [International Classification of Disease].”147 
The Vermont law thus requires insurance plans to cover the full 
range of neurological, psychiatric, substance abuse, developmental, 
and intellectual disorders.148 The Virginia law is nowhere near 
as comprehensive in scope in comparison.149 This could poten-
tially give Virginia insurers an escape hatch through which they 
could avoid covering certain legitimate mental health conditions 
by not including them in the terms of the health benefit plan.150 
Nevertheless, the Virginia law specifically tethers itself to 
the MHPAEA, requiring that the benefits provided for mental 
health and substance use disorders be in parity with the medical 
and surgical benefits contained in a plan’s coverage, in accordance 
with the MHPAEA.151 By adopting the financial requirements and 
treatment limitations of the MHPAEA for all but grandfathered 
small group plans, and mandating that plans offer mental health 
benefits, the Virginia parity law apparently goes a step beyond 
the federal law.152 In theory, the tools are present for compliance 
with the parity laws, and yet reality tells a different story en-
tirely.153 While it is possible that insurers manage to get out of 
covering mental health conditions by simply not including cer-
tain conditions in the terms of their plans, it is unclear to what 
extent this potential loophole is exploited.154 In Virginia, the law 
itself is not lacking.155 Instead, lack of enforcement is why the 
benefits of Virginia’s parity law are not realized.156 
                                                                                                                        
147 See Tovino, Reforming State Parity Law, supra note 37, at 464–65. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–4; Shemo Letter, supra note 105; 
see also supra notes 102–05. 
151 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1(B) (West 2017); see Wellstone & Domenici, 
supra note 21. 
152 See § 38.2-3412.1(B). 
153 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–3; Shemo, supra note 92; Pelonero 
Letter, supra note 111; Shemo Letter, supra note 105; see also supra notes 108–12 
and accompanying text. 
154 See MELEK ET AL., supra note 100, at 2–3; Shemo, supra note 92; Pelonero 
Letter, supra note 111; Shemo Letter, supra note 105; see also supra notes 108–12 
and accompanying text. 
155 See § 38.2-3412.1. 
156 See id. 
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B. Recent Developments: Executive Recognition that Enforcement 
of Parity Laws for Substance Use Disorders Needs to Be on the 
State and Federal Levels 
In response to an ever-worsening opioid crisis across New 
Jersey, former Governor Chris Christie called for the passage of 
a bill restricting the ability of insurance companies to deny cov-
erage for inpatient and outpatient addiction treatment.157 The bill, 
signed into law on February 15, 2017, mandates that a “hospital 
service corporation contract that provides ... benefits ... shall provide 
unlimited benefits for inpatient and outpatient treatment of sub-
stance use disorder at in-network facilities.”158 Moreover, those 
diagnosed with a SUD have treatment coverage “for the first 180 
days per plan year ... when determined medically necessary by the 
covered person’s physician, psychologist or psychiatrist without 
imposition of any prior authorization or other prospective utili-
zation management requirements.”159 Importantly, “the first 28 
days of an inpatient stay during each plan year shall be provided 
without any retrospective review or concurrent review of medical 
necessity ...” by the insurer or hospital providing care, and treat-
ment for SUDs must be covered by carriers “to the same extent as 
for any other medical condition covered under the contract,” that 
is without increased co-pays, deductibles, or co-insurance.160 In a 
promising signal of its intent, the law also emboldens the New 
Jersey Attorney General’s Office to oversee administration of the 
law and authorizes punishment for any violations resulting from 
“fraud, abuse, waste, and mistreatment of covered persons.”161 
                                                                                                                        
157 See Sarah Frostenson, New Jersey Just Passed One of the Most Aggressive 
Laws to Combat the Opioid Epidemic, VOX (Feb. 15, 2017, 4:30 PM) (noting that 
prior to passage of the law, Governor Christie called for such legislation in his 
State of the State address on January 10, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy 
-and-politics/2017/2/15/14506434/republicans-democrats-opioid-abuse-bipartisan 
[https://perma.cc/B9GM-ACS3]. 
158 See 2017 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 1 (West) (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 17:48-6nn(a) (2017)). 
159 Id. § 17:48-6nn(b) (no “prior authorization or other prospective utiliza-
tion management requirements.”); id. § 17:48-6nn(c) (“[no] pre-payment of medi-
cal expenses during this 180 day in excess of applicable co-payment, deductible, 
or co-insurance under the contract”). 
160 Id. §§ 17:48-6nn(e)–(f) (“medical necessity shall be as determined by the 
covered person’s physician”); id. § 17:48-6nn(k). 
161 Id. § 17:48-6nn(n). 
2019] A MISSING KEY IN HEALTHCARE ACCESS 573 
By putting such explicit pressure on insurance companies, 
this represents the strongest legislative reform in the nation ad-
dressing access to substance abuse treatment.162 Since the New 
Jersey law is specifically targeted at substance abuse treatment, 
the legislative and administrative fixes in New Jersey presuma-
bly do not extend to other forms of mental healthcare treatment.163 
Nonetheless, New Jersey’s bold posture serves as an example of 
what is possible for enforcement.164 The legislative and regulatory 
posture is being backed up by a concerted effort to sign contracts 
with existing acute-care general hospitals in New Jersey and build 
new private inpatient hospitals, adding nearly 900 psychiatric and 
drug treatment beds throughout New Jersey by 2019.165 After all, 
legislative and regulatory fixes are great, but if there are not 
enough providers or beds to offer services, than yelling about par-
ity will only go so far, because inadequate resources will ulti-
mately limit access due to scarcity.166 
Former Governor Christie has channeled his efforts in 
New Jersey to the national level in his capacity as the Chairman 
of the President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and 
the Opioid Crisis.167 During his remarks on November 1, 2017, 
before the Commission, then-Governor Christie responded to a 
New Jersey woman, Roxanne Schwartz, who gave heartbreaking 
testimony about her need to pay over $300,000 out-of-pocket to get 
her two sons inpatient treatment for their addictions.168 Even 
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after Roxanne filed seven appeals to her insurance company, the 
insurers refused to reimburse her.169 
While the newly passed New Jersey law would have pre-
vented insurance companies from behaving in such a way, Christie 
noted that New Jersey “is only able to regulate 30 [percent] of 
the health insurance plans in our state” with the other seventy per-
cent of plans regulated by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL).170 
While DOL is responsible for regulating the majority of health 
insurance plans in the country, it lacks the enforcement authority 
necessary to hold insurers accountable.171 
C. The President’s Commission Final Report and its  
Recommendations for Action Going Forward 
The Commission’s Recommendations recognize the impor-
tance of parity in resolving the problem of access to care.172 One 
of the most important Recommendations, number 35, recommends 
that “Congress provide DOL increased authority to levy monetary 
penalties on insurers and funders, and permit DOL to launch in-
vestigations of health insurers independently for parity viola-
tions.”173 While the MHPAEA has been on the books since 2008, 
and the final rules implementing it were published in November 
2013, the would-be enforcer, the DOL, has lacked the ability to 
enforce the law.174 That there has been formal recognition of the 
shocking lack of teeth in implementing the MHPAEA, is a posi-
tive sign for reform at the federal level.175 
Recommendation 34 also recognizes the concern of John 
Shemo discussed in Part II, supra, about the disparate levels of 
reimbursement for SUD treatment providers.176 Indeed, because 
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of the disparate rates of reimbursement, “many practitioners no 
longer take insurance, diminishing access to care even when there 
appears to be sufficient capacity.”177 To remedy this, the Commis-
sion recommends that HHS “review and modify [the] rate-setting” 
process “to better cover the true costs of providing SUD treat-
ment for both inpatient psychiatric facility and outpatient provider 
rates.”178 This again is a sound proposal, given the downward pres-
sure on access that disparate reimbursement practices have.179 
Another relevant portion of the final report, Recommenda-
tion 36, recognizes the common pitfalls that bedevil enforcement of 
the parity laws on the state and federal levels.180 While monitoring 
parity compliance for co-pays and deductibles may be a relatively 
simple task, other “non-quantitative treatment limitations” 
(NQTLs) are not so simple to comply with, and as a result often 
are not adhered to.181 NQTLs include “stringent prior authoriza-
tion and medical necessity requirements.”182 The Commission rec-
ommends that HHS review the clinical guidelines to support NQTL 
parity requirements, and that federal and state regulators use a 
standard tool requiring “health plans to document and disclose their 
compliance ....”183 Again, this is a powerful suggestion. Although 
it is one that may be more difficult to implement given the need 
for more rigorous regulatory oversight, which remains elusive.184 
These suggested regulatory and legislative interventions are 
apparently directed specifically at substance abuse treatment, but 
likely include the broader array of mental health treatments as 
well.185 This is heartening because it represents the first time that 
parity enforcement is a top priority at the highest level of govern-
ment, that is with President Trump.186 If the breakdown of state 
versus federally administered health plans across the nation is 
like that of New Jersey, that is with 70 percent of plans subject to 
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federal parity laws, then increased federal attention to enforcement 
is critical to access and could potentially cut administrative costs.187 
Potentially, however, there may be a problem of give-and-
take. Given that the opioid crisis is currently at the forefront of 
policymakers’ minds, it is possible that other mental health pa-
tients may be neglected.188 As seen in the case of New Jersey, the 
rigorous new law passed last year is specifically tailored to address 
the needs of those who require substance abuse treatment, but does 
not extend similar protections to those who suffer from serious men-
tal illnesses and who may face the same barriers to treatment.189 
It remains to be seen whether the laudable ends of the New 
Jersey law are realized, and whether there is a positive spillover 
to other mentally ill patients.190 When resources are tight how-
ever, it could be that there are winners and losers from a shift in 
resources.191 This is not to diminish Governor Christie’s efforts. 
The former Governor did well to increase access for SUD patients 
both legislatively and by physically increasing access to addi-
tional hospital beds.192 This is the kind of activity that needs to 
happen across the country.193 Giving DOL the authority to moni-
tor compliance with the parity laws, and thus giving teeth to the 
MHPAEA, would be a critical step in increasing access to mental 
healthcare across the country.194 
CONCLUSION 
For too long those with serious mental illness have been 
denied access to crucial care.195 The state of mental healthcare is 
one where finding a provider is a small miracle, and denial of 
coverage is commonplace.196 This creates a barrier to access that 
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can seem insurmountable. Often the perpetrators of these denials, 
insurance companies, are legally required to cover mental health 
patients at parity with other procedures, but fail to do so.197 A 
reassessment of the entire mental healthcare system is necessary 
to cure these longstanding deficiencies.198 
One of the foremost obstacles to access is under-enforcement 
of parity laws.199 Particularly at the state level, where much of 
insurance regulation occurs, enforcement of parity laws could rep-
resent a first step toward stabilizing a nonfunctioning market.200 
The aggressive enforcement actions of the New York AG show 
the potential of parity laws and should be emulated in other 
states.201 In a sector where resources are tight, doing more with 
less is necessary.202 
Ramped up enforcement activity is also needed on the fed-
eral level. In some states, like New Jersey, the DOL is responsible 
for regulating the majority of the state’s insurance plans.203 It is 
promising that the federal government is starting to recognize the 
importance of giving federal regulators the tools necessary to en-
force the law.204 The President’s Commission on Combating Drug 
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis holds promise of reform for sub-
stance use disorders, but it remains to be seen how exactly this 
plays out for mental health generally.205 
In the end, this is a human rights issue that has been ig-
nored for too long at the pain and expense of too many. Providers 
currently have the perverse incentive to operate outside of the 
dysfunctional insurance market.206 A shakeup is needed of the 
current regime, and a focus on working to more effectively uti-
lize the laws that exist would be a good first step toward increas-
ing access.
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